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The Battle of Chamdo (), or officially in China as the Liberation of Tibet,〔http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9C01E5DD1E3EE03BBC4B53DFBF668382659EDE&scp=1&sq=liberation+of+Tibet&st=p〕〔The Exiled Tibetan Government in India calls it the "invasion of Tibet by the People's Liberation Army of China," see (Tibet: Proving Truth From Facts. The Status of Tibet ) : "At the time of its invasion by troops of the People's Liberation Army of China in 1949, Tibet was an independent state in fact and at law."〕 was a military campaign by the People's Republic of China (PRC) against a ''de facto'' independent Tibet in Chamdo after months of failed negotiations.〔Shakya 1999 pp.28–32〕 The purpose of the campaign was to capture the Tibetan army in Chamdo, demoralize the Lhasa government, and to thus exert enough pressure to get Tibetan representatives to agree to attend negotiations in Beijing and sign terms recognizing Chinese sovereignty over Tibet.〔 The campaign resulted in the capture of Chamdo and further negotiations between the PRC and Tibetan representatives, eventually resulting in the incorporation of Tibet into the People's Republic of China. ==Background== On March 7, 1950, a Tibetan government delegation arrived in Kalimpong to open a dialogue with the newly declared PRC and to secure assurances that the PRC would respect Tibetan “territorial integrity”, among other things. The onset of talks was delayed by debate between the Tibetan delegation, India, Britain, and the PRC about the location of the talks. Tibet favoured Singapore or British Hong Kong, Britain favored New Delhi, India, and the PRC favored Beijing, but India and Britain preferred no talks at all. The Tibetan delegation did eventually meet with the PRC’s ambassador General Yuan Zhongxian in Delhi on September 16, 1950. Yuan communicated a 3-point proposal that Tibet be regarded as part of China, that China be responsible for Tibet’s defense, and that China be responsible for Tibet’s trade and foreign relations. Acceptance would lead to peaceful "liberation", or otherwise war. The Tibetans undertook to maintain the relationship between China and Tibet as one of preceptor and patron, and their head delegate Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, on September 19, recommended cooperation, with some stipulations about implementation. Chinese troops need not be stationed in Tibet, it was argued, since it was under no threat, and if attacked by India or Nepal could appeal to China for military assistance. While Lhasa deliberated, on October 7, Chinese troops advanced into eastern Tibet, crossing the ''de facto'' border〔Melvin C. Goldstein, ''A History of Modern Tibet: The Calm Before the Storm: 1951–1955,'' University of California Press, 2009, Vol.2,p.48.〕 at 5 places. The purpose was not to invade Tibet ''per se'' but to capture the Tibetan army in Chamdo, demoralize the Lhasa government, and thus exert powerful pressure to send negotiators to Beijing to sign terms for a peaceful incorporation of Tibet.〔Melvin C. Goldstein, ''A History of Modern Tibet,'' vol.2, pp.48–9.〕 On October 21, Lhasa instructed its delegation to leave immediately for Beijing for consultations with the Communist government, and to accept the first provision, if the status of the Dalai Lama could be guaranteed, while rejecting the other two conditions. It later rescinded even acceptance of the first demand, after a divination before the Six-Armed Mahākāla deities indicated that the three points could not be accepted, since Tibet would fall under foreign domination.〔Shakya 1999 pp.27–32 (entire paragraph).〕〔W. D. Shakabpa,''One hundred thousand moons,'' BRILL, 2010 trans. Derek F. Maher, Vol.1, pp.916–917, and ch.20 pp.928–942, esp.pp.928–33.〕〔Melvin C. Goldstein, ''A History of Modern Tibet: The Calm Before the Storm: 1951–1955,'' Vol.2, ibid.pp.41–57.〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Battle of Chamdo」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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